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Abstract. The paper examined the moderating role of independent directors in the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Using a sample of 37 
finance companies listed on the main market of Bursa Malaysia from 2007 to 2011, the 
result indicates a significant positive moderating effect of independent directors in the 
relationship between director ownership and ROA but a negative relationship based on 
Tobin’s Q. The result means that in a company where directors have controlling shares, 
having independent directors on the board will enhance performance since there will be 
alignment of interest of board and shareholders. On the other hand, the independent 
directors influence firm performance negatively in firms with majority ownership by 
directors since the directors who are the majority shareholders will promote their interest 
over the interest of the shareholders. The study has provided evidence on the moderating 
role of independent directors in the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. This suggests that independent directors influence the strength and direction 
of the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. 
Keywords. Ownership structure, board of directors, independent directors, firm 
performance, moderating variable. 
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1. Introduction 
he study of corporate governance and its impact on performance of 
companies is very important especially with the recent crisis and 
bankruptcies of big finance companies which has shown the impact of poor 
governance on firm performance (Westman, 2009). Poor governance in finance 
companies could indicate inability of the banking sector to manage its operations 
thereby making markets to lose confidence in the finance companies causing 
liquidity crisis (Das & Gosh, 2006). Thus, good corporate governance mechanisms 
in finance companies is essential to enhance the performance of such companies. 
Better corporate governance enhances performance of firms through enhanced 
confidence of the stakeholders in the finance companies (Kim & Rasiah, 2010). 
Good corporate governance practice is significant due to the dominant role of 
the banks in management of the payment system (Kim & Rasiah, 2010). Therefore, 
loss of confidence in the soundness of the banking system could bring negative 
effect to the investment in that sector and severe problem to accomplishment of the 
government goals of monetary policy and the economy as a whole and a great 
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impact on the vast majority of Malaysians. Good corporate governance in financial 
institutions will ensure that small depositors and less informed investors are 
protected through continuous healthy existence of the financial system (Arun & 
Turner, 2004). Brennan and Solomon (2008) defined corporate governance as the 
process of ensuring that the management is managing the affairs of a company in 
such a way that the interest of the stakeholders is protected and they do this by 
supervising and controlling actions of the management.  
International waves of crisis have also affected the finance industry of different 
countries at different times such as Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Indonesia among others (Bazdresh & Werner, 2000). These and similar events 
have necessitated the need for closer monitoring of firms, review and reforms in 
corporate governance practices of firms especially finance firms (Leuz & Wysocki, 
2008). As a result of the corporate frauds and the various crises that led to the 
companies’ poor performance in different parts of the world, the regulatory 
authorities and the accounting profession responded by developing and improving 
corporate governance codes to strengthen corporate governance practice and put 
measures to ensure compliance by companies (Ghazali, 2010). Corporate 
governance was developed to oversee how the board is discharging its functions, 
the various safeguards that are adapted to protect shareholders interest and to 
provide guidance to the board on how to discharge those responsibilities more 
effectively (Brown, Beekes & Verhoeven, 2011).  
The recent global financial crisis had negative impact on economies of different 
countries of the world and the impact came in different forms varying from 
decrease in external trade, foreign direct investment, collapse of capital market, fall 
in value of currencies, increase unemployment, large expenditure by the authorities 
to rescue the affected companies and ultimately decrease in economic growth 
(Atik, 2009). The crisis was caused among other things by the nature of ownership 
structure which provided little incentive for monitoring by the dispersed 
shareholders, weakness in corporate governance monitoring mechanism such as the 
board (Westman, 2009).  
Poor performance of the finance companies because of poor governance could 
cause liquidity problem in the financial system that in turn could lead to crisis in 
the economy and the eventual loss of confidence in the banks (Htay, Ab. Rashid, 
Adnan, & Meera, 2011). Stakeholders of finance companies have different interest, 
equity holders are concerned about the value of their investment which could 
decrease if there is poor performance while the debt holders and depositors are 
interested in ensuring their investments and deposits are safeguarded (Turlea, 
Mocanu & Radu, 2010). 
The intermediary role played by banks in an economy makes corporate 
governance in the banks very important since poor corporate governance could 
lead to poor management of the business of the banks thereby affecting their 
performance and the performance of other sectors that depend on them for 
financing (Htay et al., 2011). The effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms aimed at enhancing performance in finance companies is of interest to 
people because of the extent of losses suffered by investors and the general public 
from the global financial crisis, Asian financial crisis and the various corporate 
failures and crisis in the banking sector which seems to be a recurring event with 
financial crisis occurring about eleven times in thirty years (Dermine, 2011).  
Finance sector in Malaysia is important as a result of the role it plays in the 
implementation of government economic programmes and policies such as 
‘national economic programme/National economic policy, 1971(NEP) and 
National development policy, 1991 (NDP) (Kim & Rasiah, 2010, p.16). In addition 
government has reasonable amount of investment in the sector and the sector 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 3(1), B.S. Kallamu, p.17-30. 
19 
makes the highest contribution to GDP after manufacturing, trade and service 
sector (http://www.epu.gov.my). 
Prior studies have found that the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and performance is inconclusive and is influenced by firm 
characteristics and other factors beyond firms control implying that the relationship 
between governance mechanisms and performance is not clear and differs within 
industries/sectors and between companies (Brown et al., 2011). In addition, prior 
studies on the impact of ownership structure and independent directors on firm 
performance have reported inconsistent results. This contradictory evidence on the 
impact of ownership structure and independent directors indicates that ownership 
structure and independent directors may have indirect effect on firm performance 
suggesting that further study is needed.  
It further means that the impact of independent directors and ownership has not 
been fully explored. If the moderating role is not examined, the influence of both 
ownership and independent directors on firm performance may not be fully 
considered. This could explain the reason why prior studies are inconsistent since 
the impact of ownership on firms performance may be dependent on other factors. 
Therefore by examining the indirect effect of independent directors on the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, the study hopes to 
fill this gap. In addition, prior studies only examined direct impact of ownership 
and independent directors on firm performance.  
The indirect impact of independent directors on the relationship between 
ownership and firm performance has not been given adequate attention by prior 
studies (Hsu, Wang & Hsu, 2012) therefore the impact of board attributes have not 
be examined in a comprehensive way and this could explain the inconclusive 
results from prior studies. The study could enable investors to evaluate the 
corporate governance practices of companies and determine the mechanisms that 
influence the performance of various finance companies when certain groups of 
shareholders control the firm.  
This could enable them to identify companies with good corporate governance 
mechanisms that will ensure the protection of their interest and safeguard their 
investments. Secondly, the study provides directors with information on the impact 
of independent directors on the relationship between ownership and firm 
performance thereby enhancing their understanding of the impact of independent 
directors on firm performance and enables them to structure their boards 
accordingly.  
Finally, the findings will enable regulators to know the appropriate mechanism 
to recommend for companies based on the ownership structure in a particular 
company. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two contains 
review of literature while section three contains the theoretical background and 
hypotheses development. Section four presents the research methodology. Section 
five contains the result of the study. Section six presents results from additional 
analyses while section seven concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
Ownership structure may be determined based on the ownership of controlling 
shares in a firm by either management, directors, founding family, institutional 
shareholders or government (Ghazali, 2010; Aguilera, Desender & De Castro, 
2011). Studies have shown that concentrated ownership which is a common feature 
of ownership structure in developing countries is associated with better accounting 
performance in Malaysian companies (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Mokhtar et al., 
2009). The legal system of a country influences the nature of ownership structure 
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of companies. In countries with common law, shareholdings are mostly dispersed 
and there are investor protection laws to protect the interest of investors whereas 
concentrated ownership and less investor protection laws characterized the code 
law countries (Brown et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, ownership structure determines the extent of monitoring of the 
company’s affairs. Where there is concentration of ownership in hands of small 
number of shareholders, these shareholders or their representatives on the board are 
likely to be actively involved in performing control and service functions thereby 
reducing agency problems and enhancing performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989; 
Shan & Mclver, 2011). On the contrary, Adnan, Htay, Ab Rashid and Meera 
(2011) found that the concentration of shares is negatively related with 
performance especially where it is in the hands of insiders or institutional 
shareholders. In another perspective, Zulkafli & Abdul Samad (2007) found that all 
the types of ownership are negatively related with firm performance.   
Institutional shareholders includes mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, 
insurance companies and other non-banking organizations that invest their funds in 
shares and bonds of other firms (Aguilera et al., 2011). Their main concern is to 
maximize financial gain from their investment. According to Haat, Abdul Rahman 
& Mahenthiran (2008) investment by foreign institutional shareholders increases 
competition in the market because firms struggle to attract those investors and this 
therefore may force domestic firms to restructure to meet up with expectations of 
foreign investors.  
The restructuring could take the form of technological improvement, and 
changes in the range and quality of goods and improvement in corporate 
governance (Haat et al., 2008). In addition, this pressure will make the domestic to 
companies improve their corporate governance practices to at least the level of the 
foreign companies. Praptiningsih (2009) found that foreign institutional ownership 
is negatively related with firm performance. The ownership structure of banks in 
Malaysia is characterized by concentration of ownership with foreign investors, 
family or government as the controlling shareholders (Thillainathan, 1999).  
Institutional shareholders in Malaysia control 51.03% of shares in top ten 
companies based on market capitalization and are broadly classified into pension 
funds, mutual fund and life insurance companies and include institutional investors 
such as Employee provident fund (EPF), Lembaga Tabung Haji and Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad (Saleh, Zulkifli and Muhamad, 2010). These institutional 
shareholders significantly influence corporate governance in firms listed in Bursa 
Malaysia due to the competition to attract investment by these institutional 
investors. 
Institutional investors participate actively in governance of companies in 
different countries of the world such as CALPERS in US, in Malaysia, local 
institutional investors such as ‘Permodalan Nasional Berhad’ (PNB) and Armed 
forces fund board (LTAT) participate actively in the governance and monitoring of 
performance of companies through research and client visit (Thillainathan, 1999).  
 
3. Theoretical background and hypotheses development 
3.1. Agency theory 
Agency theory suggests that the agent will act in a way that will promote his 
interest instead of the interest of the principal unless proper corporate governance 
mechanisms are put in place to prevent that (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
agency problem is expected to be minimal when the interest of the agent and the 
principal is aligned through ownership of stake in a company by the management 
and directors. Ownership structure in most developing countries is highly 
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concentrated in the hands of small group of shareholders this creates an agency 
problem between the majority and minority shareholders (Carcello, Hermanson & 
Ye, 2011). Thus, majority shareholders may transfer economic resources to 
themselves and try to promote their interest over the interest of the minority 
shareholders.  
In order to protect the minority shareholders, independent directors are 
appointed to the board to serve as check on the management and executive 
directors (Brown et al., 2011). The extent of agency problem resulting from the 
ownership structure of a firm may affect the performance of a company and the 
performance of a firm may also affect its ownership structure when shareholders of 
a poorly performing firm decide to dispose their shareholdings thereby altering the 
ownership structure (Brown et al., 2011).  
3.2. Stewardship theory 
The theory focuses on how facilitative and empowering the structure in an 
organization are and suggests that having more executives on the board will 
increase effectiveness and produce superior results than having only independent 
directors (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). The theory is based on the assumption that 
the managers want to do good work by safeguarding the assets of the business and 
that there is no problem of motivation of managers. Therefore difference in 
performance arises from whether the structural situation in which the executive is 
situated enables effective action by the executive (Donaldson, 1990). The 
structures according to them will facilitate this goal if the role expectations are 
clear and consistent and if the senior management is empowered and authorized.  
Stewardship theory assumes that when the interest of the steward conflict with 
the interest of the owner the interest of the owner will prevail because the steward 
gives higher value to the company and works hard to achieve greater returns for the 
company and owners (Al Mamun, Yasser & Rahman, 2013). In addition, the theory 
assumes that the actions of the steward are aligned to the interest of the principal 
and that motivation of the steward will be in the form of intrinsic reward which is 
difficult to measure and different from the agency theory where the focus of the 
reward to managers is extrinsic in nature. Stewardship theory contradicts agency 
theory which believes that people are self-centered and individualistic (Al Mamun 
et al., 2013). Stewardship theory suggest that due to the information and 
knowledge advantage of the management, better performance is likely to be 
associated with greater managerial trust and powers (Donaldson &Davis, 1991). 
Stewardship theory suggests that the presence of executive directors on the board 
and board subcommittees will enhance performance of companies as a result of the 
technical knowledge and information advantage of the inside directors (Ntim, 
2009). Therefore, based on stewardship theory, where directors have majority 
shareholding, independent directors may not positively influence firm performance. 
In other words, where shareholders save as directors on companies, having 
independent directors on the board may not be a good monitoring mechanism. 
3.3. Moderating role of independent directors 
Board of directors by definition refers to the internal governing mechanism that 
shapes the firm’s governance (Brown, et al., 2011). The Cadbury report requires all 
public companies to be headed by an effective board appointed by the shareholders 
which will lead and control the company (Cadbury Report, 1992). The board 
monitors and advises the management (Aguilera et al., 2011), makes strategic 
decisions for the business, provides leadership to the company and performs 
supervisory roles with respect to the activities of the management (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989).  
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 3(1), B.S. Kallamu, p.17-30. 
22 
The revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2007) also 
provided that all listed companies should have a board of directors and that the 
board should have a balance between executive and non-executive directors so that 
the decisions of the board are not dominated by a certain group or individuals. 
Independent directors are directors who have no affiliation with the company 
except in their capacity as directors (Brown, et al., 2011).  
The independent directors are non-executive directors with integrity, expertise 
and independence to balance the interest of various stakeholders (Ponnu, 2008). 
Their presence is to bring objectivity to the board decisions and ensure the interest 
of the company and minority shareholders are protected. Although most codes on 
corporate governance (such as MCCG, King’s report) place emphasis on having 
boards with a majority of outside directors, evidence from prior studies indicate 
that having more outside directors on the board may reduce the level of board’s 
involvement in strategic decision making.  
This could be attributed to independence problem resulting from the role that 
CEO plays in selecting the directors and also due to inadequacy of time devoted to 
the work by outside directors (Zahra & Pearce, 1990). From agency theory 
perspective, the presence of outside or independent directors will help to reduce the 
agency problem in a company by monitoring the management and ensuring that the 
interest of the shareholders is protected and also helps reduce the opportunistic 
behaviour of the management thereby enhancing firm performance (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Prior studies on the governance practices of Malaysian 
companies have shown that independent directors are ineffective in monitoring the 
management which accounts for poor governance practices leading to poor 
performance of such companies (Abdul Kadir, 1999; Ghazali, 2010). 
Evidence from prior studies has shown that the impact of independent directors 
on performance of companies is mixed or inconclusive. While theoretically 
independent directors are supposed to reduce agency problem and enhance 
performance, some empirical findings have reported contrary results on the 
influence of independent directors on performance of companies.  
While studies such as Pfeffer & Salancik (1978), Pearce & Zahra (1991), Bozec 
& Dia (2005), Rebeiz & Salameh (2006) found positive relationship between 
independent directors and firm performance, Zulkafli & Abdul Samad (2007), 
Ponnu, (2008) and Adnan et al. (2011) found the opposite. Shan & Mclver (2011) 
also found positive relationship but only in larger companies. Furthermore, several 
studies have examined the impact of board composition on the performance of 
companies (e.g. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pearce & Zahra, 1990; Abdul Kadir, 
1999; Ghazali, 2010; Adnan et al., 2011; Shan & Mclver, 2011) however, the 
specific role of independent directors in moderating the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance has not been tested (Hsu, Wang & Hsu, 
2012).  
In addition, the result of prior studies discussed above have also reported mixed 
results indicating that more research is needed to test the indirect impact of 
independent directors on the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. Therefore, this study examines the moderating role of independent 
directors on the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. 
Therefore, based on the above discussion, the following hypotheses were 
examined: 
H1 Independent directors positively moderate the relationship between direct 
director ownership and firm performance. 
H2 Independent directors positively moderate the relationship between indirect 
director ownership and firm performance. 
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H3 Independent directors positively moderate the relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance. 
H4 Independent directors positively moderate the relationship between state 
ownership and firm performance. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Sample, source and description of data 
The study used secondary data extracted from the annual reports of companies 
listed on the main market of Bursa Malaysia. The annual reports were downloaded 
from the website of Bursa Malaysia or company websites. The data comprised 
corporate governance and finance data. The corporate government data was 
manually extracted from the annual reports of the companies while the financial 
information was obtained from Bloomberg data base. The unit of observation 
involves 37 finance companies and the observation period covered year end 2007 
to 2011.  
4.2. Measure of firm performance 
Prior studies on performance used different measures of performance such as 
ROE, ROA, efficiency (Kim & Rasiah, 2010), EPS, stock price and dividend 
payable to measure performance of companies (Ponnu, 2008). This indicates that 
there is no consensus on the best method of measuring performance. This study 
will use both accounting (ROA) and market measures of performance (Tobin’s Q) 
similar to prior studies such as Abdullah, (2004), Mokhtar et al., (2009), Zulkafli 
and Abdul Samad (2007).  
Although ‘Market measures of performance are more objective than accounting 
based measure’ (Gani & Jermias, 2006; p.303),they are also considered 
inappropriate because they are extracted from annual reports which are historical 
and subject to manipulation by management (Ntim, 2009). Accounting based 
measures are preferable in the context of corporate governance study because they 
reflect the ability of the management in adding value to the firm (Hutchinson & 
Gul, 2004). According to Westman (2009), the starting point for evaluating the 
performance of banks is the efficiency of their operations. 
Market measures of performance may reflect more than the financial operating 
performance of organizations such as investors’ sentiments and perception on 
future cash flow (Shane & Spice, 1983). Tobin’s Q indicates the financial strength 
of a firm and serves as a market measure of performance. The use of the market 
measure of performance (Q-ratio) could enhance the reliability of the result since 
Tobin’s Q ratio is forward looking in nature. It represents perception and the value 
investors attach to a company. The use of original Tobin’s Q ratio is difficult due to 
the difficulty of obtaining data for the computation such as the replacement cost of 
assets; therefore a close approximation of the ratio was used (Ntim, 2009). 
Although Tobin’s Q has been used widely in both corporate governance and 
finance studies, it has been criticized due to the way it is measured, its data 
requirements and computational efforts required for its computation which make 
studies use approximation instead of the original Tobin’s Q (Chung & Pruitt, 
1994). In addition, it is also considered similar to the accounting based measures 
which are calculated using historical data due to the inclusion of figures which are 
from the balance sheet and based on historical cost in its calculation (Ntim, 2009). 
Furthermore, the use of financial data could also subject the Tobin’s Q ratio to 
manipulation by the management.  
High Tobin’s Q ratio may not reflect the actual performance of a company since 
the market valuation of a firm could be influenced by other factors such as 
speculation (Henwood, 1998). Since both measures of performance have 
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shortcomings, combining the two in a study will ensure that one will address the 
weakness of the other. Following prior studies (Davies, Hillier &McColgan, 2005; 
Kashif, 2008; Goetz, Laeven & Levine, 2011; Al-Saidi & Al-Shammari (2013), 
Tobin’s Q is defined as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖 𝑛 ′𝑠 𝑄= 
 𝑀𝑉𝐸  + 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡  + 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒  𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠  + 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
(Note: MVE= Market value of equity) 
 
4.3. Control variables 
In order to reduce the possibility of wrong conclusion that could result from 
omitting variables that can predict performance and also to reduce omitted variable 
bias and endogeneity problem, two control variables (firm size & leverage) were 
added to the regression model (e.g. Pathan, 2009; Praptiningsih, 2009; Tao & 
Hutchinson, 2013). Size of a company could influence its performance through 
availability of more resources at its disposal and through enhanced monitoring due 
to the high agency problem in such type of organizations (Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006). Multiple regression analysis was used to test the relationship. The 
hypotheses developed above were examined using the following model: 
 
FPit=𝑎0 + 𝛽 1DDO*IDit+  𝛽 2IDDO*IDit+  𝛽 3IO*IDit+  𝛽 4𝐺𝑂 ∗ 𝐼𝐷 it+𝛽 5FSIZEit 
+𝛽6 LEVit  +YD+ 𝜀 it 
 
The variables in the research model will be operationalized as follows: 
FP=  firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) 
ID=  proportion of independent directors to total number of directors on the 
board 
DDO= percentage of direct ownership by directors 
IDDO= percentage of indirect ownership by directors 
IO=  percentage of ownership by institutional shareholders 
GO=  percentage of ownership by government  
FSIZE= log of total assets 
LEV= total debt over equity 
 
5. Result and analysis 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table one indicates that the data is 
normally distributed since the skewness and kurtosis values are less than ±3.00 and 
±10.00 (Kline, 1998). In addition to the test of normality based on skewness and 
kurtosis for individual variables, group normality test was performed for the model 
and the result indicates no normality problem. Furthermore, heteroskedasticity test 
was performed and the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problem were 
addressed using the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and white 
diagonal method for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation respectively.  
 
Table 1. Summary of result of descriptive statistics 
 ROA DV DDO IDDO IO GO FS LEV ID 
 Mean  0.024  0.007  0.030  0.100  0.503  0.117  0.043  0.064  0.481 
 Median  0.015  0.010  0.001  0.019  0.520  0.004  0.038  0.040  0.500 
 Maximum  0.079  0.013  0.240  0.540  0.900  0.845  0.088  0.310  0.777 
 Minimum  0.002  0.009   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.025 0.025  0.000 
 Std. Dev.  0.019  0.004  0.059  0.149  0.276  0.197  0.012  0.056  0.111 
 Skewness  1.253 -1.134  2.106  1.553 -0.209  1.924  0.737  1.183 -0.458 
 Kurtosis  3.265  2.362  6.144  4.427  1.675  5.916  2.675  4.725  4.451 
 Obs.  142  142  142  142  142  142  142  142  142 
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Note: ROA= return on assets, DV=Tobin’s Q, DDO=direct director ownership, IDDO=indirect 
director ownership, IO=institutional ownership, GO=government ownership, FS=firm size, 
LEV=leverage, ID=independent directors. 
 
The linearity assumption of the OLS regression is also fulfilled since the values 
based on the Q-Q plot are within ±3.00 range. The model does not have any 
indication of multicollinearity problem since none of the bivariate correlation is 
greater than 0.7 (Pallant, 2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Result of correlation analysis 
 ROA DV DDO IDDO IO GO FS LEV ID 
ROA  1.000 -0.048 -0.024  0.284 -0.138 -0.182 -0.003 -0.468 -0.007 
DV -0.048  1.000  0.167 -0.228  0.164 -0.142  0.064 -0.356 -0.167 
DDO -0.0240  0.167  1.000  0.070  0.042 -0.195 -0.099 -0.162  0.047 
IDDO      0.284 -0.228  0.070  1.000 -0.367 -0.298 -0.208 -0.078  0.204 
IO -0.138  0.164  0.042 -0.367  1.000 -0.332  0.208 -0.138 -0.066 
GO -0.182 -0.142 -0.195 -0.298 -0.332  1.000  0.062  0.445  0.114 
FS -0.003  0.064 -0.099 -0.208  0.208  0.062  1.000  0.082 -0.148 
LEV -0.468 -0.356 -0.162 -0.078 -0.138  0.445  0.082  1.000  0.207 
ID -0.007 -0.167  0.047  0.204 -0.066  0.114 -0.148  0.207  1.000 
Note: ROA= return on assets, DV=Tobin’s Q, DDO=direct director ownership, IDDO=indirect 
director ownership, IO=institutional ownership, GO=government ownership, FS=firm size, 
LEV=leverage, ID=independent directors. 
 
5.2. Multivariate regression analysis 
The result of regression analysis presented below indicates that there is a 
significant positive relationship between the variables examined and firm 
performance based on both measures of performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q).  The 
adjusted R
2
0.180 (ROA) and 0.123 (Tobin’s Q) indicates that the variables 
collectively explain approximately 18% and 12% of the variation in firm 
performance. The f-statistics are large 5.037 and 3.572 and the corresponding p-
value is significant (p<0.01) or lower than the alpha value of 0.05 in both cases. 
The second hypothesis predicted that independent directors moderate the 
relationship between indirect ownership by directors and ROA. The result indicates 
that independent board significantly (p<0.01) moderates the relationship between 
indirect ownership by directors and firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) 
meaning that the hypothesis is supported. The relationship is positive in case of 
ROA but negative in case of Tobin’s Q. The positive sign is empirically in line 
with agency theory which suggests that independent directors on the board will 
help to ensure that the agent acts in the interest of all principals thereby protecting 
the other shareholders from expropriation of the company’s assets by the directors 
for their own benefit (Al Mamun, 2013; Jesnse & Meckling, 1976).  
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Table 3. Summary of multivariate regression based on ROA 
  OLS  REM  FEM 
Constant  0.025536(4.365862)***  0.025492(4.333344)***  0.017246(1.655484) 
DDO*ID  0.002482(0.062870)  0.000248(0.006115) -0.141452(-1.317899) 
IDDO*ID  0.066492(3.700802)***  0.066375(3.648191)***  0.064869(1.634374) 
IO*ID -0.010788(-1.073911) -0.010565(-1.037961)  0.000759(0.035417) 
GO*ID  0.013249(0.877184)  0.012785(0.838729)  0.028644(0.918534) 
Firm size  0.190473(1.878758)*  0.187289(1.833081)*  0.203764(1.232163) 
Leverage -0.138982(-6.041342)*** -0.136992(-5.855997)*** -0.046547(-0.882595) 
                 
2008 
 
 
-0.004137(-1.071570) -0.004063(-1.087105) -0.003480(-0.923745) 
2009 -0.004595(-1.184393) -0.004529(-1.205398) -0.003659(-0.946111) 
2010 -0.004572(-1.182225) -0.004492(-1.199176) -0.003155(-0.819976) 
2011  0.001190(0.303759)  0.001348(0.355399)  0.002546(0.666578) 
R2  0.241912  0.225523  0.437712 
Adjusted R2  0.198091  0.180756  0.248915 
F-statistics  5.520555***  5.037659***  2.318422*** 
Durbin-Watson  1.597205  1.643900  2.081159 
Hausman’s Test  NA  14.100688(0.1684)  NA 
Note: *, **. *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Coefficient presented first and t-statistics in 
parenthesis. ROA=return on asset, REM=random effect method, fixed effect method. DDO=direct 
director ownership, IDDO=indirect director ownership, IO=institutional ownership, GO=government 
ownership, ID=independent directors. 
 
In addition, where directors have majority shareholdings, presence of 
independent directors will ensure that directors do not engage in non-value adding 
activities such as unrelated diversification that will not benefit the firm (Ntim, 
2009; Vishny & Shleifer, 1987). The negative direction in case of Tobin’s Q is 
theoretically inconsistent with agency theory and in line with stewardship theory 
which suggests that due to the information and knowledge of the business 
possessed by executive directors, better performance will be achieved if 
management are given more power and allowed to independently take decisions 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  The independent directors moderate the relationship 
between director ownership and firm performance by influencing the actions of 
directors who have majority shareholding. They do this by ensuring that directors 
who are also owners of the company take decisions that are in the best interest of 
the company and not just in the interest of the directors. 
The result based on Tobin’s Q implies that the independent directors will not 
ensure the interest of other shareholders is protected in the presence of high 
ownership by directors. In addition, the result implies that from market perspective, 
independent directors may not be a good monitoring mechanism in companies with 
high ownership by directors (Ntim, 2009) since owners usually participate actively 
in running the companies thereby reducing agency problem.  Lastly, the result 
indicates that hypothesis number two based on ROA as a measure of performance 
is supported since the result is in line with our prediction while hypothesis one, 
three and four are not supported based on both measures of performance. 
 
Table 4. Summary of multivariate regression based on Tobin’s Q 
  OLS  REM  FEM 
Constant  0.009112(6.780494)***  0.008504(5.797919)***  0.017246(1.655484) 
DDO*ID  0.017494(1.929062)*  0.004787(0.408170) -0.141452(-1.317899) 
IDDO*ID -0.016092(-3.898037)*** -0.010102(-2.135193)**  0.064869(1.634374) 
IO*ID -0.001714(-0.742622)  0.001823(0.689703)  0.000759(0.035417) 
GO*ID -0.002711(-0.781306) -0.002092(-0.544813)  0.028644(0.918534) 
Firm size  0.025129(1.078786)  0.025827(1.042406)  0.203764(1.232163) 
Leverage -0.022445(-4.246433)*** -0.027298(-4.367513)*** -0.046547(-0.882595) 
2008 
 
 
 0.000270(0.304764)  0.000193(0.273261) -0.003480(-0.923745) 
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2009  0.001194(1.339065)  0.001042(1.456390) -0.003659(-0.946111) 
2010 -0.000133(-0.149845) -0.000188(-0.263827) -0.003155(-0.819976) 
2011 -0.000579(-0.643389) -0.000676(-0.939030)  0.002546(0.666578) 
R
2
  0.254984  0.171148  0.437712 
Adjusted R
2
  0.211919  0.123237  0.248915 
F-statistics  5.920977***  3.572241***  2.318422*** 
Durbin-Watson  0.909785  1.274569  2.081159 
Hausman’s 
Test 
 NA  14.100688(0.1684)  NA 
Note: *, **. *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Coefficient presented first and t-statistics in 
parenthesis. REM=random effect method, fixed effect method. DDO=direct director ownership, 
IDDO=indirect director ownership, IO=institutional ownership, GO=government ownership, 
ID=independent directors. 
 
6. Additional analysis 
Evidence from prior studies indicated that there is time difference between the 
time a corporate governance mechanism is instituted and the time it will have 
impact on the performance of a company (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ntim, 2009). 
Therefore, following prior studies (Arellano & Bond, 1991) and in order to control 
for the potential problem of endogeneity, additional analysis was performed using 
generalized methods of moment to determine the extent to which the result 
presented is robust to any endogeneity problem. Estimating a model based on 
GMM is one of the ways in which endogeneity problem might be addressed. The 
result of the estimation based on GMM model is presented side by side with the 
result based on least squares model in order to enable comparison. The result of the 
estimation based on least squares for ROA and Tobin’s Q is presented in column 2 
and 3 while the result based on GMM model is presented in column 4 and 5 
respectively.  
The result obtained from the base model is similar to the result presented in 
Table 5 based on GMM except for small cases of sensitivities. Firstly, the 
coefficient of interaction between independent directors and direct director 
ownership has changed from positive to negative under both measures and has 
become significant under Tobin’s Q. Secondly; coefficient of interaction between 
indirect director ownership and independent directors has become statistically 
insignificant under both measures and has changed to positive under Tobin’s Q. In 
addition, firm size has become negative and insignificant under ROA while 
leverage become insignificant under Tobin’s Q but remained in the same direction. 
Finally, although some variables were sensitive to estimation of GMM model, 
overall the result has shown that majority of the variables in the model are robust 
to estimation based on GMM model and robust to potential endogeneity problem. 
The sensitivity could be explained by the time lag between the time the mechanism 
was instituted and the time it will have impact on relationship between board 
composition and firm performance. It could also be explained by the reduction in 
the number of period of observation and lastly, problem in the model such as 
omitted variable bias could account for the sensitivities. 
 
Table 5. Summary of estimation based on generalized method of moments 
  least squares models Generalized method of moments 
  ROA(FEM)  Tobin’s Q (FEM) ROA TOBIN’S Q 
Constant  0.025492(4.333344)***  0.0143(1.659)* - - 
DDO*ID  0.000248(0.006115)  0.0047(0.4081) -0.0447(-0.2825) -0.0266(-1.881)* 
IDDO*ID  0.066375(3.648191)*** -0.0102(-2.1351)**  0.0651(1.097)  0.0052(0.7353) 
IO*ID -0.010565(-1.037961)  0.0018(0.6897) -0.0008(-0.0178)  0.0034(0.5233) 
GO*ID  0.012785(0.838729) -0.0020(-0.5448)  0.0049(0.1745) -0.0096(-1.421) 
Firm size  0.187289(1.833081)*  0.0258(1.0424) -0.0118(-0.0759)  0.0237(1.051) 
Leverage -0.1369(-5.8559)*** -0.0272(-4.3675)*** -0.0387(-1.720)* -0.01285(-1.580) 
2007 -0.004063(-1.087105)  0.0001(0.2732) - - 
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2008 -0.004529(-1.205398)  0.0010(1.4563) -0.0025(-0.6953) 0.000528(0.8146) 
2009 -0.004492(-1.199176) -0.0001(-0.2638) -0.0018(-0.5266) -0.0003(-0.4198) 
2010  0.001348(0.355399) -0.0006(-0.9390)  0.00531(1.235) -0.0007(-1.632) 
R2  0.225523  0.171148   
Adjusted R2  0.180756  0.123237   
F-statistics  5.037659***  3.572241***   
Durbin-Watson  1.643900  1.274569   
Hausman’s Test  14.100688(0.1684)  14.100688(0.1684)   
J-statistics    2.2792(0.1311) 0.073599(0.7861) 
Wald test    87.57411***  51.29472*** 
Note: *, **. *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Coefficient presented first and t-statistics in 
parenthesis. ROA=return on asset, REM=random effect method, fixed effect method. DDO=direct 
director ownership, IDDO=indirect director ownership, IO=institutional ownership, GO=government 
ownership, ID=independent directors. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The paper examined the moderating role of independent directors in the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Using a sample of 
37 finance companies listed on the main market of Bursa Malaysia from 2007 to 
2011, we find that independent directors positively moderates the relationship 
between indirect ownership by directors and ROA while it negatively moderates 
the relations between indirect director ownership and Tobin’s Q. The study has 
provided evidence on the interacting role of independent directors in the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance.  
The finding suggests that independent directors influence the strength and 
direction of the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. 
The findings imply that the policy of the Central Bank for companies to have a 
board composed of majority independent directors is appropriate for finance 
companies since it helps to reduce agency problem. Conversely, the presence of 
independent directors may not be appropriate for companies with high director 
ownership if the companies want to get high market valuation.  
The study has highlighted the fact that although corporate governance 
mechanisms may enhance performance, their impact on performance depends on 
the context in which the mechanisms are applied. The study is robust to potential 
problem of endogeneity since the result obtained based on GMM estimation is 
similar to the estimation based on least squares model. The study is limited to only 
finance companies and based on data for five year period from 2007 to 2011. 
Future studies could increase the sample and observation period. Inclusion of 
unlisted companies and taking a sample from other sectors and economies could 
provide more evidence and enhance generalizability of these findings. Lastly, 
future studies could examine the mediating role of independent directors in the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance.  
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